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Recent Decisions
JUDICIAL ABSTENTION THROUGH THE ACT OF
STATE DOCTRINE
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
In International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v.
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit weighed the applicability of the Act of State
Doctrine' and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)' in an antitrust
suit against foreign sovereigns. The court held the Act of State Doctrine
applicable due to the politically sensitive nature of the foreign sovereigns'
activities. The FSIA was held to be inapplicable and ineffective in granting
the court jurisidction, despite any commercial nature of the sovereigns'
activities.' This case provides a discussion of the availability of civil
jurisdiction over foreign states as defendants - an area which is increasing
in both judicial and political significance as foreign state enterprises become
more involved in commercial activities inside the United States.
1. IAM v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
2. The Act of State Doctrine is a policy of judicial abstention which may bar
United States citizens' suits against foreign sovereigns.
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(d), 1602 et seq. (1976). The FSIA defines the circumstances
in which foreign states are granted immunity from suit by United States citizens. The
major area of exception is § 1605(a)(2), which provides
§ 1605(a). A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case. . . (2) in which the action is based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state;
... or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(d) provides the courts jurisdiction in non-jury civil actions against
foreign states. Section 1604 grants foreign sovereigns immunity from suit, subject to
the exceptions set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-07. According to § 1603(d), a "commercial
activity" is "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular transaction
or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by refer-
ence to its purpose."
4. 649 F.2d supra. As a basis for its holding, the court stated that the Act of State
Doctrine had not been superseded by the FSIA, and thus the court was free to deny
jurisdiction under the Act of State Doctrine, even when the FSIA would have provided
jurisdiction.
(177)
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(LAM) is a nonprofit labor association whose members work in industries that
consume large quantities of petroleum products. IAM brought suit on behalf
of its membership as consumers of petroleum products in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, against the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and OPEC's thirteen member
nations.' The OPEC organization was formed in 1960 for the purpose of
stabilizing the world's oil prices as part of an effort to obtain the greatest
possible economic return for the valuable natural resources of the member
states. IAM claimed financial injury due to inflated oil prices allegedly
caused by OPEC's price-fixing activities.6 IAM also alleged a deliberate
targeting and victimization of the U.S. market by OPEC and sought
injunctive relief and treble damages.'
In refusing to hear IAM's claim for damages, the district court held that
the plaintiff's relationship with defendant was too remote to allow for dollar
damages under the indirect purchaser rule of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois.8
OPEC and its member nations refused to submit to the jurisdiction of the
court, and their case was argued and briefed by various amici' Since entry of
a default judgment against foreign defendants is prohibited by the FSIA, the
district court ordered a full hearing on the injunction issue.1° After
considering extensive statistical and technical data, the court dismissed the
case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendants." Judge Hauk held
that the defendants, as foreign states, were protected by the immunity
5. 1AM v. OPEC, 477 F.Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affld on other grounds, 649
F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
6. Id. at 558-59.
7. Id.
8. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Illinois Brick required a pro-
ximity between tortfeasor and plaintiff in suits for money damages in order to avoid
problems of multiple litigation and the impracticability of recovering damages from a
long line of purchasers in the chain of distribution. In IAM v. OPEC the court held that
IAM's claim for treble damages was susceptible to such problems because there were
six separate purchases between defendant and plaintiff. The OPEC court allowed suit
for injunctive relief under Illinois Brick, because such a remedy would avoid many of
the problems encountered when a indirect purchaser sues for money damages.
9. For a detailed list of the concerned parties, see 477 F.Supp supra at 557-58.
10. Section 1608(e) of the FSIA prohibits entry of a default judgment against a
foreign sovereignty "unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evi-
dence satisfactory to the court."
11. 477 F. Supp. at 553.
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granted to them by Section 1604 of the FSIA.2 The court held that the
actions of OPEC's members concerned the allocation of natural resources by
foreign sovereigns - activities that are inherently political and thus
non-commercial. 3 Defendants' activities, therefore, were not included in the
"commercial activity" exception to Section 1605 of the FSIA, which would
have forfeited their immunity.1"
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, although reaching the same
result, did not adhere to the reasoning of the lower court. Circuit Judge Choy
found that due to the political sensitivity of the suit, the Act of State Doctrine
mandated that "exercise of federal court jurisdiction in this case would be
improper." 5 By affirming the lower court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction
based upon the Act of State Doctrine, the circuit court found it unnecessary
to address the issues raised in the district court regarding applicability of the
FSIA, the indirect purchaser rule, and the extra-territorial reach of the
Sherman Act.16
This note will present the Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in its
historical context, analyze the soundness of the decision, and discuss its
applicability to future plaintiffs who may seek relief from the activities of
foreign sovereigns in the commercial marketplace.
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The Act of State Doctrine (the "Doctrine") is a policy of judicial
abstention that bars United States citizens from obtaining judgments against
foreign governments by prohibiting U.S. courts from passing on the
lawfulness of acts of foreign governments that are committed within that
12. As a preliminary matter, the court dismissed the claim against the OPEC
organization itself, holding that as a foreign organization, OPEC could not be and was
not properly served.
13. Id. The court implies by this dichotomy that an activity cannot be commercial
if it is political. This idea is alien to the definition of "commercial" as provided in the
legislative history to the FSIA. "A contract by a foreign government to buy provisions
or equipment for its armed forces or to construct a government building constitutes a
commercial activity." H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94TH CONG., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in (1976)
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6615. The maintenance of armed forces is tradi-
tionally a political activity. Thus, the commercial-political dichotomy is inapplicable to
a case applying the FSIA. See Corcker, Sovereign Immunity and the Suit against
OPEC, 12 CASE W. RES. J. Irr'L. L. 215 (1981).
14. See supra note 3. The district court also held that a foreign sovereign could not
be a defendant in an antitrust action, 477 F. Supp. at 570-72.
15. 649 F.2d at 1355.
16. Id at 1361-62.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
government's sovereign territory. 7 The Doctrine even bars evaluation of the
legality of the act of state under the laws of the country in which the act
occurred."
The Doctrine can be applied by the executive branch of the United States
government, can be pleaded by foreign government defendants, or can be
raised during trial as an affirmative defense or to assert lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. If the Doctrine is applied by a court, it is the basis for a
foreign sovereignty's immunity from suit.1 9
The Doctrine is founded on the rationale that mutual respect exists
between sovereign states and that failures of this respect should not be
handled judicially, but diplomatically; facilitating the delicate manipulation
of foreign policy. 0 By preventing inconsistent policy determinations by the
judicial and executive branches of government, the Doctrine promotes a
coherent appearance of U.S. foreign policy, and thus prevents politically
embarrassing situations in which the President and the courts could oppose
one another in their treatment of foreign policy issues.2
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RATIONALE
The Ninth Circuit in IAM v. OPEC,2 described the doctrine of sovereign
immunity as one that arose out of international custom.2 The court described
how an exception to that immunity developed regarding the commercial
activities engaged in by a state. "Immunity did not exist for commercial
activities since they were non-sovereign" (emphasis supplied).24 In 1976, the
custom and its exception became law when Congress consolidated their
concepts into the FSIA.25
17. The United States' statement of the Act of State Doctrine originated in Under-
hill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). "Every sovereign state is bound to respect the
independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit
in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory."
Id. at 252.
18. See generally, Mathias, Restructuring the AOSD: A Blueprint for Legislative
Reform, 12 LAW & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 369 (1981). See also, 127 CONG. REC. 7120 (June
25, 1981).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
20. 168 U.S. 250 (1897). See also, Cooper, Act of State & Sovereign Immunity: A
Further Inquiry, 11 Lov. CHI. L.J. 193 (1980).
21. See Hahn, Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba: A Reformulation of the Act of State
Doctrine, 11 U.W.L.A. LAW. REv. 15 (1979); Cooper, Act of State & Sovereign Immunity:
A Further Inquiry, 11 Loy. CHI. L.J. 193 (1980).
22. 649 F.2d 1354.
23. Id. at 1357.
24. Id.
25. See supra note 3.
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The FSIA established the test to be applied in determining whether a
sovereign act was commercial: "The commercial character of an activity shall
be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose."2
The Ninth Circuit recognized this Congressional requirement and even
analyzed the rationale behind the distinction drawn between the nature-of-
the-act test and the purpose-of-the-act test. The nature test is objective
because it focuses solely on the type of activity, not the reason behind it. The
purpose test is subjective because it goes beyond the nature of the act to the
underlying reasons for it. Because even the most obvious commercial activity
could have a governmental purpose,' the purpose test grants broader
immunity. The court noted that Congress recognized the difference between
the two options and specifically chose to include the nature test in the
statute.'
Despite such obvious and clear intent by Congress to have courts focus
solely on the objective nature of an activity, the court held that such intent
does not supersede the "old" Act of State Doctrine principles.' Although
elements of the sovereign immunity doctrine were relevant to the IAM case,
the court reasoned that the FSIA was not applicable because it did not
consider the political repercussions of a judicial remedy. The Act of State
Doctrine, on the other hand, requires sensitivity to the sovereignty of other
nations and for that reason the court applied the latter doctrine.a
After reviewing the various benefits which have led to the creation and
continued use of the Act of State Doctrine, the court discussed several
reasons why that doctrine should prevail in the present case. First, the court
noted similarities between the Act of State Doctrine and the political
question doctrine in domestic law. The political question doctrine "requires
that the courts defer to the legislative and executive branches when those
branches are better equipped to resolve a politically sensitive question."3' The
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). See supra note 3.
27. See 649 F.2d at 1357 n. 6.
28. Id. at 1357. See supra note 13. The court was not unaware of Congressional
intent. See infra notes 69-74.
29. Id at 1359.
30. Id. at 1360. The court here uses distinctions between the Act of State Doctrine
and the FSIA to justify its preference. Although these differences do exist, the Act of
State Doctrine does not specifically exclude application of the FSIA, as the court im-
plies.
31. Id. at 1358-59. The political question doctrine was stated in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962). The doctrine is misnamed, as it deals with the justiciability of an
issue, rather than the issue's political nature. The doctrine concerns "the relationship
between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Government." Id. at
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political question doctrine is grounded in the principle of separation of
powers, an idea which is "central to our form of democratic government."32
The court reasoned that the similarities between the Act of State Doctrine
and the political question doctrine cause the Act of State Doctrine also to be
integral to our structure of government and thus to be paramount to other
countervailing considerations in the area of judicial abstention.3" As such, the
Act of State Doctrine must be examined before considering any grant of
jurisdiction that may have been made available by the legislative branch.
The court also reasoned that the significant differences between the
FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine cause the latter to prevail. Sovereign
immunity is solely jurisdictional because it relates only to the availability of
judicial power. The Act of State Doctrine, on the other hand, is a
non-jurisdictional doctrine that is more prudential since it concerns the
appropriate use of that power and can be employed "to avoid judicial action in
sensitive areas."' The court found sovereign immunity to be simply a
statutorily-recognized principle of international law. The Act of State
Doctrine, on the other hand, is a domestic legal principle with broader
applications that can be invoked in any case where state sovereignty is
challenged. 5 As a result, the Act of State Doctrine is applicable whenever a
court considers sensitive issues involving sovereignty."'
210. When applied, the doctrine renders an issue nonjusticiable, due to the judiciary's
respect for another branch of the government or a desire to avoid embarrassment to
another branch regarding a policy decision already made. See also, Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) and NOWAK, ROTUNDA &
YOUNG, CONSTTUTIONAL LAW, 100-10 (1978).
32. 649 F.2d at 1359.
33. The first similarity outlined by the court is that both doctrines require courts
to defer to the legislative and executive branches in certain situations. The court
reasoned that despite the legislative mandate in the FSIA, the Act of State Doctrine
was applicable, because "like the political question doctrine, its (the AOSD) application
is not subject to clear definition." Id. at 1358-59. The amorphous nature of the Act of
State Doctrine, as compared to the clear mandate from Congress in the FSIA, appears
to be especially attractive to the court.
34. Id. at 1359.
35. Id. The Act of State Doctrine has been considered in cases where no foreign
sovereign was a party to the suit. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T.
& S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), the Act of State Doctrine was raised by the
defendant bank (not a branch of a foreign sovereign) in an effort to prevent the ex-
amination of transactions by the Honduran government. See infra note 39 and accom-
panying text. See also, Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329
(E.D.N.Y. 1977).
36. 649 F.2d at 1359.
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The court recognized that the differences between the two doctrines
would have to be disregarded if Congress so mandated. 7 After reviewing the
legislative history of the FSIA, as well as previous Congressional discussions
of sovereign immunity, the court concluded that Congress did not intend for
the FSIA to supercede the Act of State Doctrine, thus leaving it intact.'
Judicial precedent also suggested that the Act of State Doctrine, rather than
FSIA, be used whenever a politically sensitive issue was sought to be
avoided. In deciding (contrary to the mandates of the FSIA) that the
subjective purpose of an action is the dispositive criterion, rather than the
action's objective nature, the court relied on Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank
of America39 by citing, "This court has stated that the motivations of the
sovereignty must be examined for a public interest basis (emphasis
supplied)." 0 The issue in Timberlane was whether previous proceedings
brought by the present defendants in Honduras courts and the Honduran
government's enforcement of the resultant rulings, constituted an act of state
by the Honduran government. In the Honduran case, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendants had conspired to unite their claims against the plaintiff
and sought to deny it the opportunity to settle its debts out of court."1 As a
result of the alleged conspiracy, and the court orders that followed the suit,
the plaintiff's business in Honduras was destroyed. The defendants in
Timberlane contended that the Honduran court orders were acts of state by
the Honduran government since they were issued and enforced by that
sovereign. The defendants contended that because the Act of State Doctrine
prevented judicial examination of such acts, the suit must be dismissed. 2 The
Ninth Circuit in Timberlane found the Act of State Doctrine inapplicable
because although the actions that caused the plaintiff's downfall were
governmental in origin, the purpose behind those actions was not to protect a
public interest, but to protect the interests of private litigants working
37. The court specifically stated that the Act of State Doctrine was not superseded
by the FSIA. Id.
38. Id. at 1359-60. See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 35.
40. 649 F.2d at 1360. The court cited Timberlane (a pre-FSIA opinion also written
by Judge Choy of the Ninth Circuit) as authority for the court's use of the purpose test
rather than the nature test in assessing the commercial character of an activity. The
court did not cite any post-FSIA case as authority for its decision to apply the Act of
State Doctrine.
41. 549 F.2d at 604.
42. Id. at 604-05.
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through Honduran law."3 The court held that Honduras had not been acting
for itself (i.e., it did not have a claim against the plaintiff), but was acting
merely as the adjudicator of a private dispute. The rulings of the Honduran
court, therefore, were reviewable."
Drawing from the reasoning of Timberlane, the court in IAM v. OPEC
determined that applicability of the Act of State Doctrine centers on the
underlying purpose (public or private) of a sovereign's actions. "When the
state qua state acts in the public courts its sovereignty is asserted." 5 In such
cases "the courts must proceed cautiously to avoid an affront to that
sovereignty."4 The FSIA, therefore, may not be invoked when a public
interest is involved, because it ignores the sovereign's underlying purpose,
which was found to be essential in Timberlane. The court went further to
hold that the commercial nature of any sovereign act that might lead a court
to consider the FSIA should be disregarded. Judicial caution is paramount
and "the Act of State Doctrine remains available when such caution is
appropriate, regardless of any commercial component of the activity involved"
(emphasis supplied).
The court's second major argument resting on precedent in favor of the
Act of State Doctrine was based on the approach used in Banco National v.
Sabbatino,18 a case involving a suit brought by a financial agent of the Cuban
government to recover payment from one of the agent's American brokers for
conversion of bills of lading. The Act of State Doctrine was raised by the
respondent to prevent judicial inspection of the original agreement made by
the Cuban government.49 The Ninth Circuit, in lAM v. OPEC, cited
Sabbatino and applied the approach it called for in striking a balance
between the public's need for a judicial remedy against the potential for
interference with U.S. foreign relations. "[Siome aspects of international law
touch more sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the
43. Id. at 608. Obviously, enforcement of Honduran law is in the public interest.
Since such an interest is not limited to the Timberlane case, the court in IAM v. OPEC
held that examination of OPEC governmental actions would not involve evaluation of
specific policy decisions by OPEC governments. As a result, OPEC actions should not
have been immune from U.S. judicial review.
44. Id. It is relevant to note that Timberlane challenged neither the propriety of
the laws of the Honduran government, nor that government's application of its own
laws.
45. 649 F.2d at 1360.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Banco National v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
49. Id. at 400-08.
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implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the
justification for exclusivity in the political branches."'5
In balancing the various interests involved in this suit, the Ninth Circuit
found that the record revealed significant involvement by the executive and
legislative branches with the oil pricing problem. The court noted that even
IAM did not dispute the United States' "grave interest in Mideast petro-
politics."5' Because monitoring the activities of OPEC is a sensitive area of
American foreign policy, the possibility of judicial interference in U.S.
foreign relations became extremely significant. The court held, therefore,
that the Sabbatino balance tipped decidedly toward judicial abstention. 52
The OPEC court also applied a second aspect of the Sabbatino decision -
that of "the availability of internationally accepted legal principles which
would render the issues appropriate for judicial disposition."53 Quoting
Sabbatino, the court took notice that the greater the international consensus
concerning an issue, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to deal with
that issue." Such a consensus gives the court clear and accepted guidance in
how to decide a case. In examining the international consensus concerning
the issues involved in this case, the Ninth Circuit found the principle of state
sovereignty more universally accepted than antitrust laws. "The United
States and other nations have supported the principle of supreme state
sovereignty over natural resources."' The OPEC case points out, however,
the disagreement which is festering among nations concerning antitrust law.
"The record reveals no international consensus condemning cartels, royalties
and production agreements . . . [tihe OPEC nations themselves obviously
will not agree that their actions are illegal."' ' The court reasoned that
50. 649 F.2d at 1360, citing, Sabbatino, supra note 48 at 428.
51. 649 F.2d at 1361.
52. Id. For a further discussion of this balance, see infra note 89 and accompany-
ing text.
53. Id.
54. 649 F.2d at 1361, citing, Sabbatino, supra note 48 to 428:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus con-
cerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the
application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national in-
terest or with international justice.
55. 649 F.2d at 1361.
56. Id. The court seems to be considering the opinion of the defendants in making
its determination of the legality of their actions. If courts generally considered defen-
dants' opinions as dispositive in deciding antitrust suits, convictions under the Sher-
man Act would be rare indeed.
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judicial action in such an area of international disagreement would be
inappropriate.
The OPEC court concluded by stating that because the Act of State
Doctrine bars judicial entrance into an area best left to the legislative and
executive branches of our government, "the issue of whether the FSIA allows
jurisdiction need not be decided, since a judicial remedy is inappropriate
regardless of whether jurisdiction exists."7 Similarly, the court held that it
did not need to reach either of the other issues raised by the lower court: the
indirect-purchaser rule and the availability of foreign sovereigns as antitrust
defendants.5
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
In choosing to apply the Act of State Doctrine instead of the FSIA, the
court found that:
(1) The Act of State Doctrine was not superseded by the FSIA due to the
intent expressed by Congress in both 1973 and 1976;11
(2) The FSIA and the Act of State Doctrine address different concerns
because the FSIA ignores the underlying purpose of a sovereign's
activities, while the Doctrine is more sensitive to the political goals
of a foreign sovereign; and
(3) The "crucial element" of the court's decision to deny judicial relief
under the Act of State Doctrine is "the potential for interference
with our foreign relations.'
The fundamental assumption made by the court is that the Act of State
Doctrine should take precedence over the FSIA. Without this assumption, the
court would not have been free to consider the Act of State Doctrine at all.
The court found Congressional intent expressed in two statements made
in House Reports; one from the 1973 report by the 93rd Congress on the
original version of FSIA,7 and the other from a footnote in the 1976 report
57. Id. at 1361-62.
58. Id.
59. "It has been suggested that the FSIA supersedes the AOSD ... We disagree."
Id. at 1359.
60. Id. at 1360.
61. The FSIA 'in no way affects existing law concerning the extent to which the
'AOS' doctrine may be applicable in similar circumstances."' Id. at 1359, quoting, Im-
munities of Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 3493 before the Subcomm. on Claims &
Governmental Relations of the Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd. CONG., 1st SEss. 20
(1973).
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accompanying the actual bill.2 The 1973 statement, however relevant and
conclusive it may be, was rendered unauthoritative of Congressional intent
by the 1976 House Report. The 1976 Report specifically stated
The committee wishes to emphasize that this section-by-section analysis
supersedes the section-by-section analysis that accompanied the earlier
version of the bill in the 93rd Congress (that is, S. 566 and H.R. 3493,
93rd Congr. 1st Sess.); the prior analysis should not be consulted in
interpreting the current bill and its provisions, and no inferences should
be drawn from differences between the two (emphasis supplied).'
The court's use of the 1973 statement, therefore, is a complete deviation from
the intention of Congress.
The second statement used by the court to interpret Congressional intent
must be read in its original context." The statement is part of a sentence in a
footnote to FSIA Section 1605(a)(3).1 Section 1605(a)(3) unequivocally denies
sovereign immunity in cases involving property that is taken in violation of
international law. The House Committee was advised that in some cases,
after the defense of sovereign immunity has been denied or removed as an
issue, the Act of State Doctrine may be improperly asserted in an effort to
block litigation. The committee felt, however, that this problem need not be
addressed, since the courts had already provided substantial guidance in
filtering out invalid Act of State Doctrine defenses. "The committee found it
unnecessary to address the Act of State Doctrine in this legislation since
decisions such as that in the Dunhill' case demonstrate that our courts
62. The court cited to only part of a sentence. The full sentence follows, with the
portion cited in IAM v. OPEC in italics: "The committee has found it unnecessary to
address the AOSD in this legislation since decisions such as that in the Dunhill case
demonstrate that our courts already have considerable guidance enabling them to re-
ject improper assertions of the AOSD." H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th CONG., 2d SESS. 20 n.1,
reprinted in, (1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6619 N.1. See infra note 65 and
accompanying text.
63. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th CONG., 2d SESs. 12, reprinted in, (1976) U.S.CoDE
CoNG. & AD. NEws 6111.
64.See supra note 62.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3).
66. See supra note 63 at 6618. Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). In
Dunhill the respondent government of Cuba claimed that its refusal to pay a commer-
cial debt was not reviewable as an act of state by the Cuban government, The Court
rejected this defense because elevating the commercial acts of foreign states to the
protected status of an act of state would defeat the purpose of the commercial excep-
tion. See 425 U.S. at 690-95.
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already have considerable guidance enabling them to reject improper
assertions of the act of state doctrine."6 7
The court in IAM v. OPEC chose to cite only the beginning of the
above-quoted sentence. "The committee has found it unnecessary to address
the act of state doctrine in this legislation ... "6 By thus inaccurately citing
to the committee report, the court took the words entirely out of their
original context. Such a misquote greatly altered the committee's intended
meaning. In fact, the footnote today continues to provide an example of when
the Act of State Doctrine would surely not apply. "For example, it appears
that the doctrine would not apply to the cases covered by H.R. 11315 (the
present bill), whose touchstone is a concept of 'commercial activity'. ' 9 The
committee chose not to address the Act of State Doctrine not because, as the
court assumes, "Congress recognized the distinction between sovereign
immunity and the AOS," 70 but because Congress believed that the Act of
State Doctrine would not apply in any case to commercial activities, and that
the courts already had provided enough acceptable guidance in "rejecting
improper assertions" of the Doctrine (emphasis supplied).71
In addition to selecting only those words from the House Committee
Report which support its holding, the court also disregarded the Congression-
al purposes of enacting the FSIA. Congress was concerned with the plight of
the private litigant. "A private party who deals with a foreign government
entity cannot be certain that his legal dispute with a foreign state will not be
decided on the basis of nonlegal considerations." 2 The FSIA was to solve this
problem by describing "when and how parties can maintain a lawsuit against
a foreign state or its entities in the courts of the U.S. and to provide when a
foreign state is entitled to sovereign immunity."73 To specifically avoid
conflicts between the FSIA and the other doctrines, the Act set forth "the sole
and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign
immunity" (emphasis supplied).7" The intent of Congress, therefore, is as
obvious as the Ninth Circuit's disregard for it.
67. See supra note 63 at 6619.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 649 F.2d at 1359.
71. The report went on to say that Congress agreed with the government's amicus
brief in Dunhill, which warned that "to elevate the foreign state's commercial acts to
the protected status of an 'Act of State' would frustrate this modem development (of
the commercial exception) by permitting sovereign immunity to reenter through the back
door, under the guise of the AOS" (emphasis supplied). See supra note 63 at 6619,
citing, amicus brief of United States at 41.
72. Id. at 6607.
73. Id. at 6604.
74. Id. at 6610.
JUDICIAL ABSTENTION
USE OF THE FSIA WOULD LEAD TO ADJUDICATION OF JAM's CLAIM
The Ninth Circuit avoided the FSIA because application of that Act
would have forced the court into exercising jurisdiction over an action it
believed inappropriate to decide. Since the acts of the OPEC members fall
precisely into Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA (the commercial activities
exception), correct application of the FSIA would have waived the OPEC
members' sovereign immunity and allowed the court to decide the merits.
Section 1605(a)(2) specifically excludes immunity for the "commercial
activities" of a foreign sovereign. Section 1603(d) defines "commercial
activity" and prescribes a method for its determination. "The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to
its purpose."" The legislative history further refines this definition by
specifically excluding any "public purpose" from the consideration. "The fact
that goods or services to be procured through a contract are to be used for a
public purpose is irrelevant;, it is the essentially commercial nature of an
activity or transaction that is critical" (emphasis supplied)."6
Applying the FSIA requires a court to remove the political aspects of an
activity and examine solely the objective nature of that activity." The
objective nature of OPEC's activities can only be viewed as price-fixing; a
classically commercial activity. 8
Even if OPEC's actions should improperly be viewed as regulation of
natural resources, 9 they are commercial actions since the legislative history
of the FSIA specifically includes mineral extraction companies as commercial
enterprises.' The actions considered here are not those concerned with a
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
76. See supra note 63 at 6615.
77. The Ninth Circuit recognized this requirement and even included a lengthy
footnote citing examples. 649 F.2d at 1357 n. 6.
78. Concurrence on this assessment can be found in articles analyzing the district
court opinion. See, Crocker, Sovereign Immunity and the Suit against OPEC, 12 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'L L. 215, 227-28 (1980); Burman, Restrictive Immunity and OPEC, 8
HOFsTRA L. REV. 771, 791, 806-07 (1980). "[f an activity is customarily carried on for
profit, its commercial nature could readily be assumed." See supra note 63 at 6615. The
driving force for price fixing is not, as the court presumes, allocation of resources.
Resources can be allocated regardless of their selling price; the sole impetus for price-
fixing is profit maximization.
79. Such a categorization is improper, because it includes in its description the
purpose of the activity.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) defines commercial activity as "a regular course of com-
mercial conduct." The legislative history defines this phrase as "A 'regular course of
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single country's decisions on how much oil it will sell; LAM sued on the basis
of alleged collusion between many nations. Once the OPEC nations began
fixing the price of oil, they were no longer merely regulating their own
resources, they were involved in the maximization of profits; an inherently
commercial activity.81
The test required by Congress also is appropriate because it provides a
clear and predictable standard to be applied by both courts and potential
litigants. "This approach would clarify legal analysis by assessing the
validity of acts of state according to their own legal merits as economic or
commercial acts rather than their fleeting association with any political
questions that such acts may or may not raise."82 In addition, if a United
States citizen is ever going to find redress in U.S. courts, governmental
purposes must be separated from judicial examination because all actions,
regardless of nature, which involve a foreign sovereign will retain some
governmental purpose. The declared aim of the FSIA is to "provide when and
how parties can maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state."" To deny
adjudication in all cases where any governmental purpose, no matter how
insubstantial, is involved would entirely thwart the goal of this legislation.
Such abstention additionally disregards the foremost responsibility of the
United States judicial system - to provide an adequate forum in which
United States citizens may seek redress.
FUTURE PROBLEMS
In addition to its arbitrary denial of redress to United States citizens, the
Ninth Circuit has created a situation with possibly alarming future
ramifications. Judge Choy, in deciding to ignore Congress' nature-of-the-act
test, refused to apply relevant statutes which apply directly to the LAM case.Y
The task of the court is to apply the law, not to ignore it when it is
convenient to do so.' The result of allowing such judicial independence is
commercial conduct' [including] the carrying on of a commercial enterprise such as a
mineral extraction company" (emphasis supplied). Note 63, supra at 6614-15. See also,
Crocker, supra note 78.
81. See also, Timberg, Sovereign Immunity & Act of State Defenses, 55 TEXAS L. R.
1, 37 (1976).
82. Id. at 37. For a full discussion of the benefits of the test for commercial activ-
ity, see, Id. at 15-16.
83. See supra note 63 at 6604.
84. See supra note 78.
85. The U.S. Constitution allocates the judicial power: "The judicial Power of the
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CoNST. ART. 111, § 1. Had
JUDICIAL ABSTENTION
that individual judges will selectively enforce laws by their own preferences,
thus defeating the Constitutional goal of democratic rule via a republican
form of government.R Although this author is not predicting anarchy as a
result of the 1AM holding, it is valuable to note that this holding does hint at
possible Constitutional violations resulting from such judicial abstention. 7
The "Sabbatino balance"' also has the potential to improperly encourage
judicial abstention. The balance describes a justification for judicial absten-
tion where such justification increases in strength as an issue rises in
importance. While this rationale for abstention may be apposite when
considering OPEC and the world's oil supply, the idea, without qualification,
could become a ready-made excuse to allow courts to avoid a case merely
because of its significance. Extension of this idea could lead to cases where an
issue becomes so important that the court is compelled to avoid it.
One cannot ignore, however, the impracticalities of a judicial remedy in
the present case. Although Section 1606 of the FSIA requires that foreign
states which are not entitled to immunity "shall be liable in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances," 89 enforcement of injunction orders involving foreign
sovereigns can be extremely difficult. Conceivably, the United States could
enforce an injunction against OPEC by using economic boycott or armed
forces, but such drastic measures would require a major foreign policy
decision, most probably not as a result of an injunction ruling from the Ninth
Circuit.R Perhaps when he decided not to apply the FSIA, Judge Choy was
considering the ineffectiveness of such an injunction, while also considering
the framers of the Constitution intended to make exercise of the judicial power option-
al, they would have made that intention clear. However, such power was not made
optional to the courts. It was vested.
86. The Constitution creates a republican form of government by providing that
representatives be elected by the populace. It grants law-making power only to those
specifically enumerated. "All Legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Repre-
sentatives." U.S, CONST. ART. I, § 1. The legislative history of the FSIA also cites the
Constitutional authority which allows Congress to enact the FSIA. See supra note 63 at
6611.
87. To date there have been no Supreme Court decisions on the Act of State Doc-
trine/FSIA conflict.
88. The Sabbatino balance is defined as follows: "The less important the implica-
tions of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusiv-
ity in the political branches (i.e., the weaker the justification for not adjudicating that
issue)." 649 F.2d at 1360, citing, 549 F.2d at 607, citing, Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1606.
90. See Crocker, supra note 78 at 229.
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"the possibility of insult to the OPEC states."9' Because the court could not
effectively administer the relief requested, Judge Choy may have opted not to
risk insult to the defendants in this situation.
The most troublesome problem with IAM v. OPEC may be the lack of
specificity in its holding. Vague, general and unqualified opinions are prone
to misinterpretation by other courts. By arbitrarily denying redress to United
States citizens, the court has shirked its major responsibility, and by not
applying the appropriate law, the court steps toward an unconstitutional
degree of independence. With its unqualified use of the Sabbatino balance,
the court implies that a legitimate excuse for abstention becomes stronger
with the increase in an issue's importance.
Richard Bardos
91. 649 F.2d at 1361.
